Mega-regional trade Agreements: Costly distractions for developing countries? by Narayanan, B. & Khorana, Sangeeta
Mega‑regional trade Agreements: Costly 
distractions for developing countries?
Badri G. Narayanan1* and Sangeeta Khorana2
1 Introduction
Prior to the Brexit and USA’s withdrawal from Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), mega-
regionals were the latest trend in trade Agreements. The best-known examples of 
mega-regional Agreements are the TPP, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Part-
nership (TTIP) between the USA and the European Union (EU), both promoted by the 
USA, and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) between Aus-
tralia, China, India, Japan, Korea, New Zealand and ten countries of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In particular, TPP and TTIP are classic examples 
of mega-regional Agreements that seek to introduce innovative content that reflects 
twenty-first-century trade and economic exchanges such that commitments undertaken 
on “traditional and new areas of trade” are likely to have far-reaching implications on 
global trade regulation and public policy. This paper examines how these critical mass 
Agreements could be employed to bring some of the mega-regionals’ new rules and 
issues into the system? While studies specifically analyse the economic implications of 
TPP and TTIP on developing countries, no work focuses on how such mega-regional 
Agreements that aim to liberalize “substantially all trade and investment” can potentially 
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impact on global health through commitments on tariff elimination and stronger intel-
lectual property (IP) rules.
This paper identifies how trade commitments, based on the intrinsic characteristics 
of the provisions or chapters in TPP and TTIP, could interact with and impact on public 
health in developing countries. This follows from the concerns that the haste of negotia-
tors to conclude deep Agreements could impose ill-conceived constraints on domestic 
regulators’ access to medicines and has wide-ranging implications for public health poli-
cies in developing countries by feeding into domestic regulation. We analyse two inter-
linked policy concerns: firstly, how tariff reduction/elimination under mega-regional 
Agreements impacts on production of sugar, and by inference higher consumption. 
A second related policy area examined is the impact of mega-regional commitments, 
which include Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS)-like and TRIPS-plus commitments, on IP protection rules and even modifica-
tion of such rules by partner countries, thus impacting the access of people in develop-
ing countries to life-saving drugs and medicines.
Tariff reduction/elimination on sugar, beverages and sugar products can have direct 
health implications for populations of partner countries’ populations. The health impli-
cations stem from the fact that while reductions in barriers to trade increase consumer 
food choices and improve supply for net-food-importing countries, trade liberalization 
can lead to disproportionate increase in imports and domestic production of processed 
foods, skewing the food supply towards an oversupply of highly processed foods that 
are calorie-rich and nutrient-poor (Clark et al. 2012). Thus, lower/no tariffs and lower 
prices of these products will lead to higher consumption that is scientifically linked to 
adverse dental health with possible association with obesity, diabetes and cardiovascular 
conditions. Similar is the case with higher tobacco consumption that has proven adverse 
health effects increasing the risk and incidence of oral and lung cancer. It is in the con-
text of such health concerns from increased consumption of these products that require 
policy-makers in developing countries to carefully analyse health effects of deep “across-
the-board” commitments (see Clarke 2008; Roffe et al. 2008). In this context, addressing 
health concerns and devising appropriate public policies to keep a check on burgeon-
ing health expenditure are key, given that trade policy can impact on partner countries’ 
domestic pharmaceutical industries through providing (a) access to medicines and (b) 
incentives for innovation in the development of new life-saving drugs.
While several studies model the economic effects of trade liberalization, there is lim-
ited analysis that examines the health effects of zero tariffs and stronger IP rules from a 
public health perspective. It is in this context that the link between zero tariffs, on sugar 
and sugary beverages, and tobacco and tobacco products, is examined by this paper and 
how these are likely to contribute, on the one hand, to adverse impact on people’s health, 
while stronger IP commitments can pose a policy paradox for policy-makers, on the 
other. This also addresses a related question whether commitments under mega-regional 
Agreements that address trade issues and twenty-first-century challenges can be her-
alded as a truly next-generation regional Agreement.
This paper employs dynamic GTAP (GDyn) model firstly to examine the effects of TPP 
and TTIP on production, consumption, prices and trade of “harmful” products, i.e. sugar 
and tobacco, over 2015–2030 and secondly to assess the costs as a result of imposing 
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stringent IP rules across the world following commitments under these mega-regional 
Agreements. The analysis focuses primarily on developing countries. Results indicate 
that there are significant health consequences of commitments undertaken by develop-
ing countries in that firstly, there is notable expansion in the production of sugar (about 
0.3% per year) due to trade liberalization; secondly, while stricter IP rules are likely to 
lead to net global gains in terms of gross domestic product (GDP), poorer countries suf-
fer implying that even without accounting for the “health justice” argument about allow-
ing access to medicines stricter IP rules are likely to work against the poorer countries.
2  Related literature
At the multilateral level, trade in health products and services are governed by the WTO 
Agreements. The WTO-TRIPS Agreement (Article 8) recognizes the right of WTO 
members to “adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition and to 
promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and 
technological development, provided that such measures are consistent with the provi-
sions of the Agreement”. It is common knowledge that developing countries have been 
averse to committing to TRIPS at the multilateral level, mainly on the grounds that the 
interests of developing countries are comparatively less reliant upon knowledge-based, 
intellectual property intensive goods and services which makes these countries’ consum-
ers and net importers of intellectual property, not producers and net exporters1 (Gais-
ford et al. 2007). The reluctance of developing countries is based on the fact that they 
have to bear significant costs of adjusting to the TRIPS Agreement, which requires insti-
tutional and judicial infrastructure to educate, inform, implement, regulate, manage and 
enforce IPR protection provisions. Historically, developing countries’ joined the TRIPS 
Agreement with much reluctance with the carrot of greater market access to developed 
country markets for their agricultural goods and textiles, in combination with the stick 
of exclusion from the WTO and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
for the exports of their goods should they not join TRIPS (Kerr 2003, 2007, 2011). Devel-
oping countries’ incentives to joining the TRIPS have been eroded by the fact that the 
promised increased trade via greater market access for agricultural goods and textiles 
has not materialized as developed countries have implemented strategically blocking 
tactics (Kerr 2005). Of late, TRIPS has impacted on countries’ health policy through tar-
iff reduction, as is the case with sugar and tobacco. In addition, patent protection and 
innovation as well as through the diffusion of new technologies to populations are 
related issues impacting on developing countries’ policy space.
The TRIPS Agreement includes specific rules on compulsory licensing, parallel 
importation and the application of patent law. For instance, Article 30 allows govern-
ments to make limited exceptions to patent rights provided certain conditions are met. 
The Agreement goes on to recognize that such exceptions must not “unreasonably” 
conflict with the “normal” exploitation of the patent and must not unreasonably preju-
dice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, while taking the legitimate interest of 
1 The value of a single global IPR standard where all nations strive to that of the USA, for example, is debatable when as 
Drahos (2003) notes strong patent protection makes sense for the USA, with over 3600 scientists and engineers involved 
in research and development per million people, but less so for a country such as Rwanda whose ratio of 35 scientists 
per million clearly illustrates the lesser role IPR plays in its economy.
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third parties into account. Article 31 of the Agreement allows developed and developing 
countries to provide for compulsory licensing in their national legislation and does not 
limit the reasons for which governments may grant compulsory licences. Having said 
this, governments’ use of a patent without the authorization of the right holder can only 
be done only under a number of conditions that protect the legitimate interests of pat-
ent holders. There have, however, been instances when generic producers and origina-
tor companies in developed and developing countries have disagreed on issues of patent 
linkage and/or the extent of data protection. A prominent case law example extrater-
ritorial application of national laws under TRIPS is European Union-Seizure of Generic 
Drugs in Transit (WT/DS408, May 2011). Yet another Article 30 interpretation is in case 
law Canada-Pharmaceuticals (WTO/DS114) that allows countries to allow manufactur-
ers of generic drugs to use the patented invention, without the patent owner’s permis-
sion and before the patent protection expires, for the purpose of obtaining marketing 
approval from public health authorities.
At the mega-regional, standards committed are higher than TRIPS, i.e. TRIPS-plus, 
and are increasingly a norm and common feature. The same applies at the bilateral level 
and analysis shows that TRIPS-like commitments require partners to commit bilaterally 
to the protection of IPRs, often far in excess of the minimum standards beyond and what 
was internationally agreed upon in the TRIPS Agreement. The literature also confirms 
this growing trend to increasingly include TRIPS-like and even higher commitments, 
i.e. TRIPS-plus (Vivas-Eugui 2003; Reichenmiller 2005). Such provisions take several 
forms: first, TRIPS-plus commitments extend the protection on patents, particularly 
for pharmaceuticals and data, which take the form of wider patent applicability, restrict-
ing patent oppositions, and/or extension of the patent durability. In fact, data exclusiv-
ity and patent registration are common TRIPS-plus pharmaceutical patent provisions 
undertaken at a bilateral level. Examples of patent strengthening provisions include the 
extension of duration patents on agrochemicals and pharmaceutical products from 20 to 
25 years and industrial designs from 10 to 15 years, most common in several US RTAs. 
There are examples of extension of patent duration beyond the TRIPS commitment of 
20 years, under the US–Macedonia regional trade Agreement (RTA) where patents on 
agrochemicals and pharmaceutical products have been increased from 20 to 25 years, 
and the EU-Morocco RTA where patents on industrial designs were increased from 10 
to 15 years. In addition, the USA is also implementing provisions in RTAs that automati-
cally extend patent terms if an extension is granted in a third country (El Said 2010).
Stronger IPR enforcement with penalties for non-compliance or violations is another 
common feature of bilateral commitments. Further, data exclusivity commitments are 
increasingly common within bilateral settings. For instance, Roffe et  al. (2008) exam-
ine the issue of implementation of data exclusivity commitments in Jordan and Guate-
mala following RTAs with the USA. The study suggests that intellectual property rules 
reduced access to some generic drugs already on the market and delayed new entry of 
other generics. Further, TRIPS-plus provisions also limit or undermine developing coun-
tries’ policy options for legislating and using TRIPS flexibilities, even though safeguards 
and flexibilities were included in the TRIPS Agreement to enable governments to protect 
public interests, including access to medicines. This has led to concerns that TRIPS-plus 
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provisions in FTAs will undermine public health safeguards and objectives—notably 
access to medicines, as well as delay generic market entry and competition.
These concerns are particularly pertinent within the context of the TPP Agreement, 
which has been positioned as a “model” for the twenty-first century implying that simi-
lar provisions are likely to appear in future trade Agreements, including those involving 
developing countries. The analysis of TPP commitments suggests that the Agreement 
reaffirms participating countries’ commitment to the WTO’s 2001 Declaration on the 
TRIPS Agreement and public health. It is interesting to note that the TPP does include 
a specific chapter with commitments that have implications for the health sector. The 
TPP Agreement, however, includes specific commitments by partners on pharmaceu-
ticals-related provisions, which relate to the development of innovative medicines and 
availability of generic medicines, and in fact provides for stronger protection of IP. The 
IP chapter also includes commitments on the protection of undisclosed tests and other 
data submitted to obtain marketing approval of a new pharmaceutical or agricultural 
chemical product. However, no linkage between low tariffs on agricultural products 
and health linkage has been deliberated upon in the Agreement. Ongoing TTIP talks, 
between the EU and USA, do not explicitly highlight the link between lower tariffs and 
implications on health policy from information available in the public domain.
3  Methods
In this section, we describe the model, the assumptions underlying the baseline projec-
tion for the dynamic simulations and TPP/TTIP policy shocks. We also underline the 
methodological caveats of the study.
3.1  Model description
We implement simulations based on the GTAP dynamic model. GDyn is a multi-sec-
tor, multi-region recursive dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, 
described in Ianchovichina and McDougall (2001). Detailed information on GDyn data-
base construction and parameterization of the model as well as various applications of 
GDyn model are available in Ianchovichina and Walmsley (2012).
GDyn model adopts a disequilibrium approach to modelling capital mobility, allow-
ing short- and medium-run differences in the rates of return across regions, implying 
imperfect capital mobility over the medium term. The dynamics of capital adjustment 
eliminate these differences in the long run, resulting in long-run perfect capital mobility 
across regions.
Investment in a given region, allocated by the global trust, depends on two factors: 
expectations on the rates of return and the global balance between investment and sav-
ings. In the model, capital drifts away from regions with lower expected rates of return 
to those with higher returns. Over time, therefore, the expected rates of return come 
down, resulting in the equalization of expected and actual net rates of return within and 
across regions in the long run.
Financial assets (equity interests in physical capital) are incorporated in the model to 
capture the welfare effects of international capital mobility. In this accounting system, 
firms own physical capital, but rent land and natural resources from regional house-
holds, which also own financial assets laying indirect claims on physical capital. Regional 
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households hold equity in firms in all regions through a fictional entity called “global 
trust” that allocates foreign investment. Thus, their wealth is the sum of their equities 
in domestic firms and in the global trust. The saving of each regional household is allo-
cated to domestic and foreign investment, on the assumption that the shares of domestic 
and foreign investments are held constant, subject to adding up constraints to balance 
regional accounts. The model does not attempt to capture real financial sector dynamics.
GDyn has been shown to be able to realistically capture dynamics in several ways (Ian-
chovichina et al. 2014).2 Furthermore, GDyn model captures the capital mobility due to 
specific policy shocks, by different channels; firstly, the changes in fundamentals of these 
economies owing to cost reduction facilitated by trade can help allocate investment 
more or less in a region depending on the extent to which it has become competitive and 
investment-friendly; secondly, there are direct shifting levers that can shock the extent of 
policy facilitation that can encourage investment.
3.2  Baseline projection
For the purposes of our study, we run the model on the GTAP 8.1 database, documented 
in Narayanan et  al. (2012), with 2007 as the base year. We work with 22 countries/
regions and 32 sectors, aggregated from 134 countries/regions and 57 sectors available 
in the GTAP database.
Table 1 sets out the regions/sector aggregations.
We project the database to 2030 drawing on historical data for GDP, population and 
labour supply for the period to 2015 and on long-run projections from Chappius and 
Walmsley (2011) for the period to 2030. These long-run projections are derived from 
Foure et  al. (2010), from the projections for 128 countries to 2050, based on a three-
factor production function (capital, labour and energy), accounting for the energy 
constraint through dynamic modelling of energy productivity, and applying a Feldstein–
Horioka-type relationship between savings and investment rates.
A baseline assumption is that the supply of factors other than capital and labour is 
exogenous. Capital supply in the model is determined by the savings–investment mod-
ule while labour supply, for both skilled and unskilled labours, adjusts to keep the real 
factor price of labour fixed. In other words, this is a labour-unconstrained baseline, 
wherein there is unlimited supply of labour to draw from, for economic growth implied 
by the GDP baseline. Another assumption is that the recently concluded WTO Trade 
Facilitation Agreement (TFA) is fully implemented by all countries. This assumption is 
implemented by removing all tariff equivalents of time as a barrier to trade, as estimated 
by Minor and Hummels (2011), by 2015. This reduces the goods sector Non-Tariff Bar-
riers (NTBs) in the baseline, hence reducing the scope for the TPP/TTIP to boost addi-
tional trade.
Table 2 summarizes the baseline assumptions employed. Almost all low-income coun-
tries are expected to grow faster in terms of GDP than the developed economies. For 
instance, India is expected to grow faster in terms of population and labour force. We 
2 For example, Walmsley, Hertel and Ianchovichina (2006) accurately anticipated the degree and timing of the tapering 
off of China’s high growth and inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI). This practical validation provides some confi-
dence in the application of the GDyn model for the present purpose, though this particular phenomenon doesn’t have a 
direct bearing to TPP/TTIP features.
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note that there is a visible shift towards skilled labour and away from unskilled labour in 
many countries in the world; this comes from the IIASA baseline for labour force, which 
takes into account global trend towards improved educational and human capital attain-
ment that would lead to increased availability of skilled labour force.
3.3  Closures
Under the GTAP model’s default microeconomic closure, factor endowments (i.e. the 
total supply of labour, both skilled and unskilled, as well as of capital and land) are fixed 
and factor prices adjust to restore full employment of the factors of production in the 
post-shock equilibrium.3 Alternatively, the return to capital or to labour can be fixed and 
the supply of capital and/or labour adjusts to restore equilibrium.4 In the GDyn model, 
investment adjusts to changes in the rate of return. In addition, by fixing wage rates, we 
allow labour supply to adjust to changes in wages. As a result, the TPP/TTIP impacts 
3 This is sometimes described as reflecting a medium-term time horizon in which labour supply is relatively “sticky”.
4 The closure rule in which the rate of return to capital is fixed is sometimes described as reflecting longer-run “steady-
state” growth conditions.
Table 1 List of regions and sectors Source: Assumptions by the authors
Regions
 1 Japan 12 India
 2 China 13 Australia
 3 Korea 14 New Zealand
 4 Taiwan 15 USA
 5 Singapore 16 Canada
 6 Indonesia 17 Mexico
 7 Malaysia 18 Chile
 8 Philippines 19 Peru
 9 Thailand 20 Russia
 10 Vietnam 21 EU28
 11 Rest of ASEAN 22 ROW
Sectors
 1 Rice 17 Non-ferrous metals
 2 Other grains 18 Metal products
 3 Sugar 19 Machinery
 4 Other crops 20 Electronic equipment
 5 Livestock 21 Motor vehicles
 6 Fossil fuels 22 Other transport equipment
 7 Natural resources 23 Other manufacturing
 8 Meat 24 Construction
 9 Dairy products 25 Trade
 10 Other food products 26 Sea transport
 11 Textiles 27 Air transport
 12 Apparel 28 Other transport
 13 Wood and paper 29 Communication
 14 Petroleum products 30 Financial services
 15 Chemical products 31 Other private services
 16 Steel 32 Government services
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generate “endowment” effects: that is, the amount of labour and capital in an economy 
change based on changes in returns to labour and capital. Compared to simulations that 
adopt the default closure, our simulations show larger impact on quantities and less 
impact on prices.
As regards GTAP’s macroeconomic closures, two approaches are available. First, the 
current account can be fixed. This assumes that the external balance is determined 
entirely by domestic investment–savings dynamics. When trade policy shocks result in 
unbalanced changes in imports and exports, the original trade balance is then restored 
by implicit exchange rate adjustments. Alternatively, the current account can be allowed 
to adjust to the trade shock. The choice of macroeconomic closure can also have signifi-
cant implications for the model outcomes.5 We necessarily adopt the closure where the 
current account adjusts; this reflects the active role of FDI in our model. In other words, 
due to the flexibility of current account, in order to make sure that net exports and the 
sum of net savings and net factor income equal each other, investment can move from 
one country to another, to keep up with the movements in trade. This is also the reason 
why the tariff and NTB shocks that affect trade can also affect investment.
5 See DeRosa and Gilbert (2004) for a comparison of the impact of using alternative macroeconomic closures in the con-
text of modelling the Korea–US FTA. The fixed current account simulations substantially reduce the economic welfare 
gains for Korea (to three-fifth the level of the simulation with flexible current account) and marginally (by 5%) for the 
USA.
Table 2 Baseline projections (2015–2030: Annualized) Source: Calculations by the authors, 
based on Foure et al. (2010)
Population  
growth (%)
GDP  
growth (%)
Unskilled labour  
force growth (%)
Skilled labour  
force growth (%)
Japan − 0.46 1.10 − 1.40 0.49
China 0.31 7.30 − 0.33 2.26
Korea 0.00 1.68 − 1.09 1.76
Taiwan 0.24 4.53 − 0.55 1.73
Singapore 0.51 1.91 − 2.67 1.94
Indonesia 0.71 5.39 0.64 3.37
Malaysia 1.08 4.36 0.24 3.87
Philippines 1.35 4.42 1.53 3.56
Thailand 0.33 4.80 − 0.78 2.48
Vietnam 0.82 4.59 0.57 3.51
Rest of ASEAN 0.82 4.56 0.23 4.33
India 0.92 6.80 1.09 3.68
Australia 0.85 2.02 − 0.11 1.51
New Zealand 0.68 2.22 0.03 1.34
USA 0.72 2.07 − 0.13 1.58
Canada 0.82 2.14 0.06 0.84
Mexico 0.61 3.21 0.46 2.68
Chile 0.66 2.70 0.33 2.43
Peru 0.63 2.96 0.39 2.56
Russia − 0.45 2.69 − 1.36 0.14
EU28 0.03 1.44 − 1.55 1.03
ROW 1.35 3.88 1.44 3.51
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3.4  Description of policy shocks
To evaluate the effects of TPP and TTIP, it is necessary to make assumptions about the 
content of these Agreements and the scale of the resulting policy shocks. The TPP is 
reportedly essentially locked up but the details are not known; how significant the com-
promises will turn out to be in terms of the level of ambition remains to be seen. The 
TTIP has run into relatively strong headwinds over the issue of regulatory convergence 
and is both on a slower track than TPP and also less certain in terms of how far and 
through which modalities it will progress.
As our concern is to demarcate the potential scope for spill over, we adopt assump-
tions that represent relatively ambitious outcomes. The scenarios are thus in the nature 
of a “thought experiment” rather than a forecast based on the following assumptions. 
First, all industrial tariffs are removed among the TPP member countries as well as TTIP 
member countries by 2030, with some exceptions based on the “best guess” scenario 
propounded by Ciuriak and Jingliang (2014)6; for the automotive and textiles and cloth-
ing sectors, we assume gradual phase-out of tariffs. For agriculture, we exclude tradi-
tionally sensitive sectors, including rice into Japan, sugar into the USA, dairy into 
Canada. Otherwise we eliminate the protection in the GTAP version 8 database.
Second, for goods NTBs for manufacturing and agricultural sectors, commonly used 
estimates from Kee et al. (2009) correspond to early 2000 and are outdated at this point. 
We use NTBs estimated by Hummels and Minor (2009) for “time as a barrier to trade” 
and reduce them as described above to take account of the WTO TFA in developing 
the baseline projection. The remaining goods NTBs are reduced slightly under the TPP/
TTIP, to capture the reduction in duplicative conformity assessment arising from mutual 
recognition within the TPP/TTIP zone. This amount to 0.25% reduction in the cost of 
trade for manufactured goods, other than electronic products for which we assume such 
practical measures have already been exhausted, following Ciuriak and Jingliang (2014).
Third, NTBs in services are reduced. Estimates of the ad valorem tariff equivalents 
(AVEs) of services NTBs from Wang et  al. (2009) and Brown et  al. (2010) as imple-
mented by Lee and Itakura (2015) are used. Table  3 provides a summary of the tariff 
equivalents of NTBs. These AVEs are introduced into the dataset from 2007 to 2012 and 
then reduced by up to 20% under the TPP/TTIP, based on an estimate provided by Lee 
and Itakura (2015).
Fourth, an increase in the real wages of unskilled labour in developing countries 
across the world as a result of increase in labour standards owing to the TPP/TTIP is 
an assumption. These increases range from 0 to 20% (some evidence to this extent has 
been provided in Narayanan et al. 2016), in an inversely proportionate way to the size 
of per-capita GDP of the country; in other words, poorer countries would face a higher 
increase in real wages, since they would incur higher costs in improving their presum-
ably low labour standards. Table 4 shows the extent to which we raise the real unskilled 
wages in these simulations.
Fifth, a similar schema for environmental standards, based on per-capita income, is 
adopted. We identify the sectors in terms of emissions intensity, so as to introduce lower 
6 This is based on the revealed willingness of the participants to make concessions in FTAs.
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Table 3 Average tariff equivalents (ad valorem, %) of  NTBs in  services (2015) Source: 
Adapted by the authors from Wang et al. (2009), Brown et al. (2010) and Lee and Itakura 
(2015)
India 111.70
Australia 15.38
New Zealand 10.75
USA 6.8
Canada 18.64
Mexico 50.32
Chile 22.35
Peru 43.24
Russia 65.64
EU28 8.56
ROW 40.52
Others ~ 30
Table 4 Projected percentage increase in  costs and  productivity from  standards compli-
ance (2015–2030)
* Average % rise in real capital costs in different sectors
** Average % rise in real labour costs in different sectors
*** Average % rise in productivity owing to replacement of vintage capital resulting from adoption to standards
Labour standards** Environmental standards* IP rules* Vintage capital***
Japan 0 0 0 0
China 5.75 0.58 0.86 2.3
Korea 0.74 0.07 0.11 0
Taiwan 0.93 0.09 0.14 2.3
Singapore 0.42 0.04 0.06 2.3
Indonesia 8.36 0.84 1.25 2.3
Malaysia 2.29 0.23 0.34 2.3
Philippines 9.9 0.99 1.48 2.3
Thailand 4.36 0.44 0.65 2.3
Vietnam 20 2 3 2.3
Rest of ASEAN 20 2 3 2.3
India 14.66 1.47 2.2 2.3
Australia 0 0 0 0
New Zealand 0 0 0 0
USA 0 0 0 0
Canada 0 0 0 0
Mexico 1.65 0.16 0.25 2.3
Chile 1.63 0.16 0.24 2.3
Peru 4.26 0.43 0.64 2.3
Russia 1.76 0.18 0.26 2.3
EU28 0 0 0 0
ROW 4.74 0.47 0.71 2.3
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costs of compliance to these standards for less polluting industries across the world. 
The costs range between 0 and 3% of real costs of capital (Table 4). Sixth, for IP regime 
compliance, capital costs ranging between 0 and 2%, again inversely related to per-capita 
income, are imposed. The results are summarized in Table 4. For both these aspects, the 
assumptions are supported by evidence discussed in Narayanan et al. (2016).
Seventh, as summarized in Table 4 the rise in productivity due to replacement of vin-
tage capital is derived from the results for Japan shown by Hagiwara and Matsubayashi 
(2014), using the data from 1980 to 2007. This study highlights two main results of rel-
evance for Japan—this productivity effect has been 0.15% per year and the total replace-
ment-induced productivity from 1980 to 2007 was more than twice the real GDP growth 
in this period. We assume the former to hold for the developing countries in this study. 
We make this assumption mainly due to lack of data availability and we acknowledge 
this is a limitation; however, since the capital replacement and productivity related to it 
are a very specific technical phenomenon that may not necessarily vary across countries, 
particularly given that Japan grew from a poorer country to a rich one, much like the 
countries in our model, this is not a completely flawed assumption. Thus, even though 
developing countries grow, as is the case with Japan, it is natural that the quality and 
composition of capital goods vary across countries. As a result, the relationship between 
capital formation and productivity growth also varies across countries.
Eighth, for modelling the expansion in market access due to compliance with stand-
ards, the assumption is that 20% of all the disadvantages created in terms of prices will 
be recovered by improved market access. Without the compliance, these countries 
would have had no market access; we assume that such a disadvantage is partly removed 
by complying with these standards. The basis for the degree of this assumption is drawn 
from Narayanan et al. (2016).
While many of our shocks do not directly affect investment, unlike the negotiations 
in TTIP, for example, there are strong indirect effects on investment. Firstly, as men-
tioned before, movements in trade due to reduction in trade costs can actually also move 
investment around, to preserve the balance of payments condition. Secondly, we have 
shocks to capital costs in the model, which have direct bearing on investment, through 
the increasing or decreasing capital costs that trigger demand for capital and hence 
growth in investment.
3.5  Methodological limitations
While the GDyn model is quite robust, a few caveats as regards the data used for the 
analysis as well as in respect of the simulations are highlighted.
First, a large number of provisions under negotiation in the TTIP and TPP overlap 
with the TFA. While we reduce the NTBs by the time cost of border transit, this may not 
entirely capture the NTB reducing effect of the TFA. Accordingly, our policy shock for 
goods NTBs might overstate the remaining room for NTB reduction under TPP/TTIP.7
Second, both TPP and the TTIP measures addressing FDI are understood to be major 
aspects of those negotiations. While our model does capture investment dynamics 
7 A related caveat pertains to the timing of implementation of the TFA versus the TPP/TTIP. This is unknowable and 
we have assumed full implementation of all three as of 2015 for convenience. This may affect which Agreement actually 
would be the first mover and thus could claim credit for particular impacts.
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across the world quite rigorously, we do not explicitly incorporate policies and responses 
of FDI in detail.
Third, the shock on services’ NTBs is based on ad valorem equivalents estimated by 
Lee and Itakura (2014); these shocks are substantially greater than has been realized 
in past FTAs (see Narayanan et al. 2016) concerning the discrepancy between services 
NTB shock estimated in conventional fashion versus based on exact coding of the legal 
text of the Canada–Korea FTA against the OECD’s Services Trade Restrictiveness Index 
(STRI) as well as the provisions in Canada–Korea Free Trade Agreement. Similar reser-
vations would hold for the NTBs in goods sectors as well. Therefore, our results in these 
aspects should be considered more in terms of insights and qualitatively in direction, 
rather than in terms of exact numbers.
Fourth, we do not explicitly take into account the utilization of preferences or the costs 
of utilizing preferences. Utilization of preferences involved in goods trade is rather low, 
especially for the exporters from developing countries. This has been illustrated, for 
example, in Mimouni et al. (2014). There are several reasons behind this, such as lack 
of awareness among the exporters, high costs of certification and compliance to meet 
the preferences, and rules of origin. Data on utilization employed by Mimouni et  al. 
(2014) stand on a comprehensive transaction-level dataset on exports to certain parts of 
the world, mainly EU and USA. But, we could not incorporate this into our study, since 
this is needed for other countries as well to yield meaningful results. Thus, again, by not 
accounting for these costs of utilization, we are overestimating the economic impacts of 
these trade Agreements.
Fifth, our model and dataset do not have the linkages to fully capture the impact of 
increased protection for IP. In principle, increased IPRs create rents for producers, 
which in turn induce innovation and investment. The required market structure to 
capture increased rents is that of imperfect competition which includes markups; this 
mechanism is not, however, available in the GDyn model, nor is an innovation module 
that would translate increases in rents for IPR-protected firms into investment in R&D. 
Since the benefit of increased R&D would likely flow primarily to the leading R&D cen-
tres (the USA, the EU and Japan), the absence of this linkage for purposes of our study of 
spillovers on India is relatively limited.
Sixth, we do not deal with liberalization of public procurement. This is of limited con-
sequence since it is well established that most procurement is done through local pres-
ence in procurement markets. Despite this fact, we do acknowledge that the aspects 
of public procurement, if any, that are part of these Agreements, are not considered in 
this study, and to that extent, the results related to the public sector-related aspects may 
carry some limitations.
Finally, sensitivity tests of the results to different baselines are conducted. In general, 
non-TTIP/non-TPP countries and most of the smaller economies in the TPP countries 
have higher growth rates in the base case. While this could be the most plausible view 
of the world in future, it is essential to test the robustness of our results to the base-
line assumption; for this purpose, we consider two alternative worldviews. One entails 
assuming a faster-growing set of economies in TPP and TTIP partners, while the second 
one involves assuming faster-growing non-TPP/non-TTIP countries. Since we found the 
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results to be broadly in line with the ones shown in this study, we do not show them 
herein.
All these observations strengthen our view that the results from this analysis must be 
seen as an upper bound of what could happen in reality had TPP went ahead, and TTIP 
may progress.
4  Results
The simulations shed light on several variables and policies, and focus on two broad 
aspects. First, these look at the average annual impact on production of sugar across 
countries from 2015 to 2030. Table 5 shows that sugar consumption is often positively 
affected both by raising standards and reducing tariffs in developed countries, while 
sugar consumption in developing countries is adversely affected.
The net global effect turns out to be around 0.3% per annum, which is a notable rise in 
sugar consumption globally. World Health Organization (WHO) estimates (2015) show 
that worldwide, many populations consume sugars at levels that exceed the WHO’s 
sugar guideline, such as Brazil, Canada, South Africa, the UK and the USA. Sugar 
Table 5 Average annual impact of TPP and TTIP on sugar consumption in % terms (2015–
2030)
Region TPP TTIP Services 
NTBs
Labour
stand-
ards
Environ-
mental 
standards
IP rules Improved 
access
Productiv-
ity
effects
Total 
effectTariffs Tariffs
Japan − 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 0.1 0.6
China − 0.3 − 0.3 − 0.3 − 0.8 − 0.3 − 0.2 0.3 0.4 − 1.5
Korea − 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 0 0.1 0.7
Taiwan − 0.1 − 0.1 − 0.1 0 − 0.1 0 0.1 − 0.1 − 0.4
Singa-
pore
0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 − 0.1 0.1 0.7
Indonesia − 0.2 − 0.1 − 0.2 − 0.6 − 0.1 − 0.1 0.1 0.3 − 0.9
Malaysia 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 − 0.1 0.5 1.2
Philip-
pines
− 0.2 − 0.1 − 0.1 − 0.5 − 0.1 − 0.1 0.1 0.2 − 0.8
Thailand − 0.3 − 0.1 − 0.1 − 0.2 − 0.1 0 0.1 0.3 − 0.4
Vietnam 0.3 0 0.1 − 0.8 0 0 − 0.1 0.3 − 0.2
Rest of 
ASEAN
0 0 − 0.1 0.3 0 0 0 0.3 0.5
India − 0.1 − 0.1 − 0.1 − 0.9 − 0.1 − 0.1 0.1 0.3 − 1
Australia 1 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0 2
New Zea-
land
0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0 0.1 0.9
USA 0 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 0.1 1.1
Canada 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 0 0.1 1.1
Mexico 0.3 0 0 − 0.1 0 0 0 0.2 0.4
Chile 0.1 0 0 0.1 0 0 0 0.4 0.6
Peru 0.3 0.1 0.1 − 0.1 0.1 0 0 0.4 0.9
Russia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.3 0.3
EU28 0.1 0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0 0 0.1 0.5
ROW 0.2 0.0 − 0.1 − 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1
Average 0.0 0.0 0.0 − 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3
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consumption is growing, especially in low- and middle-income countries. Between 
2000–2001 and 2013–2014, global sugar consumption grew from about 130–178 million 
tonnes and is expected to reach about 182 million tonnes in 2014–2015. Almost three 
quarters of global sugar consumption each year takes place in developing countries. This 
overconsumption of sugar is taking place in the context of a cheap and abundant supply 
of sugar on the world market, which can be attributed to lowering/elimination of tar-
iffs on sugar and sugary products that are likely to boost sugar consumption. The WHO 
(2014) draft guideline on sugars intake proposed that sugars should be <  10% of total 
energy intake per day. But tariff reduction on sugar will have the opposite effect on pub-
lic health.
Second, as given in Table 6, stricter IP rules have a net positive effect globally in terms 
of employment and GDP and a net negative effect in terms of investment. Thus, new 
competing investment that could improve access to medicine may be hindered by these 
rules, and even apart from this, we note that poorer countries are adversely affected by 
stricter IP rules.
TRIPS-plus-style commitments under mega-regionals allow transition periods for 
developing countries. But these also allow rights and privileges to foreign investors, 
with the obligation on governments to provide protection of such rights. Such obliga-
tions can significantly restrict a government’s ability to regulate how companies operate 
within its national borders, which may then have an impact on the promotion of access 
Table 6 Impact of strict IP rules on changes in employment, GDP and investment
Region Unskilled 
employment  
(in % terms)
Skilled  
employment  
(in % terms)
GDP  
(in % terms)
GDP (value  
terms—change  
in $ millions)
Investment  
(in % terms)
Japan 0.11 0.15 0.16 6834.61 0.33
China − 0.07 − 0.09 − 0.31 − 18,787 − 0.52
Korea 0.09 0.13 0.12 1302.97 0.27
Taiwan − 0.05 − 0.05 − 0.13 − 547.56 − 0.18
Singapore − 0.01 − 0.01 − 0.02 − 38.39 − 0.04
Indonesia − 0.03 − 0.05 − 0.21 − 1463.4 − 0.19
Malaysia 0 0.01 − 0.05 − 140.37 − 0.07
Philippines − 0.05 − 0.07 − 0.2 − 375.53 − 0.31
Thailand − 0.01 − 0.02 − 0.08 − 254.15 − 0.15
Vietnam 0.03 0.05 0 − 2.49 0.05
Rest of ASEAN 0.01 0.09 − 0.04 − 39.43 0.02
India − 0.07 − 0.09 − 0.3 − 5206 − 0.48
Australia 0.01 0.01 0.01 104.77 − 0.02
New Zealand 0.06 0.07 0.08 139.08 0.1
USA 0.1 0.12 0.13 16,865.3 0.22
Canada 0.07 0.07 0.08 1446.44 0.11
Mexico − 0.01 − 0.02 − 0.05 − 665.77 − 0.02
Chile 0.05 0.05 0.01 28.71 0.09
Peru 0.05 0.04 0.04 58.43 0.01
Russia 0.02 0.03 0 41 0.23
EU28 0.09 0.12 0.13 17,993.4 0.33
ROW − 0.02 − 0.03 − 0.07 − 10,424 − 0.07
Average 0.01 0.01 0.01 312.3 0.01
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to medicines and the protection of public health in general. In this manner, the potential 
impact on public health of the deep provisions on investment highlights three areas of 
concern. First, the expansive rights and privileges accorded foreign investors, with the 
corresponding obligation on governments to provide protection of such rights is likely 
to have the effect of significantly restricting governments’ ability to regulate how compa-
nies operate within their national borders. Current disputes in tobacco regulation dem-
onstrate the potential public health implications that may arise from broad definitions 
of “investment” and the obligation to protect investors and their investments. Second, 
the investment provisions combine strong investors’ rights and high protection stand-
ards with a dispute settlement mechanism (the ISDS), which would provide the “teeth” 
for enforcement of those obligations. It is also noted that IP rights are included in the 
definition of “investment”, which would mean that a government measure affecting 
the intellectual property holdings of investors may be considered an “expropriation” or 
the withholding of “fair and equitable treatment”. This raises concern about the ability 
of governments to implement and use the range of TRIPS flexibilities, many of which 
could be seen as limitations or restrictions of the exclusive rights granted under a patent. 
Although the proposals provide that compulsory licensing does not constitute an expro-
priation where such a licence is granted “in accordance with the TRIPS Agreement”, this 
still leaves room for investor corporations to challenge the compulsory licence using the 
ISDS on the grounds that it does not comply with TRIPS. A related concern is that the 
extensive investor rights and the ISDS framework might provide a legal framework by 
which corporations may challenge any government measure, thus engendering a “chill-
ing effect” on government regulation and action.
5  Conclusions and policy implications
The TPP Agreement and proposed TTIP go well beyond traditional trade concerns and 
includes, among other elements, extensive obligations related to IP and investor protec-
tion. In fact, the health concerns with the TPP arise from the intensification of existing 
trade provisions and unprecedented protections for investors and intellectual property 
right holders. The analysis of commitments and modelling exercise support the view that 
the mega-regional Agreements are likely to have major implications for public health 
and access to medicines. The IP obligations under TPP exceeded the minimum stand-
ards of the multilateral WTO Agreement on TRIPS. The potential health effects of TPP 
and TTIP cannot be ignored and need the attention of negotiators, not merely because 
of the adversity in terms of health, but also due to the magnitude of overall economic 
effect. While the promotion of free trade via tariff elimination and economic growth is 
important, it must be balanced against the need to ensure both a population’s access to 
needed medicines and its long-term health and well-being. While the annulment of TPP 
or putting the TTIP on hold has not been done with the potential impacts in mind, it 
is important that policy-makers are wary of the effect of the mega-regionals and how 
these can translate into gains for countries in the public health domain. This is due to 
the fact that the simulation results suggest an increase in sugar production that is a silent 
killer in terms of being a contributor of obesity and diabetes. Further, if countries adopt 
TRIPS-plus provisions this is likely to threaten access to pharmaceuticals for people in 
developing countries, which points in the direction that the negotiating countries may 
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wish to consider the types of measures that would strengthen and further expand the 
gains made in the effort to increase treatment access.
 Another important implication is that the importance of relationship between IP 
rights and competition law cannot be understated. While IP protection effectively vests 
exclusive control of production and supply of protected invention in the rights holder, 
competition law seeks to encourage a multiplicity of suppliers in order to ensure effec-
tive competition in the market place. In most developed countries, higher standards 
of IP protection have evolved alongside the development of norms providing effective 
defence against anti-competitive practices related to the acquisition and exercise of IP 
rights. The policy objective from the perspective of developed countries is, therefore, 
to achieve a balance between intellectual property rights and competition that is appro-
priate to the domestic context. But this represents a complex challenge in developing 
countries given most lack competition law framework and/or effective mechanism for 
implementation of anti-competitive practices. Despite such practical concerns, most 
developing countries have undertaken deep intellectual property rights commitments as 
well as expanded existing ones without the capacity to implement, which is a matter for 
thought.
The empirical information made available by this paper can serve a variety of pur-
poses. First and foremost, it provides a basis of evidence to inform policy-makers and 
strengthen their position in trade negotiations. The information can help to identify 
those areas in which greater flexibility in the negotiation of new IP standards may be 
warranted, or can make the case that new standards may not be desirable at all. Further, 
in countries that have adopted TRIPS-plus standards as under TPP, the evidence can 
provide an important basis from which to identify complementary policies that can rem-
edy or alleviate the negative impacts of implementation.
In this light, governments may wish to adopt coherent approaches, in which trade 
and IP policies are formulated in a manner that preserves developing countries’ ability 
to provide long-term, affordable and sustainable access to medicines. While the cur-
rent state of annulling the TTP talks and uncertainty around TTIP are not attributed 
to these concerns, ongoing mega-regional (and bilateral) negotiations must bear these 
policy aspects in mind. It is, thus, imperative that governments adopt a “positive agenda”, 
wherein they actively identify and implement policies that can help achieve the goals of 
trade and economic growth, alongside the objectives of ensuring access to needed medi-
cines and the protection of public health. This leaves the question unanswered whether 
commitments under mega-regional Agreements addressing trade issues and twenty-
first-century challenges are next-generation regional Agreements, and if such commit-
ments are likely to impact on policy space of developing countries.
Authors’ contributions
BN conceived, designed and implemented the simulations and prepared the manuscript. SK prepared the manuscript, 
explained some of the results in the model and pursued literature review. Both authors read and approved the final 
manuscript.
Author details
1 University of Washington Seattle, 21746 SE 3rd PL, Sammamish, WA 98074, USA. 2 Bournemouth University, Poole, UK. 
Acknowledgements
We hereby acknowledge useful comments from anonymous conference abstract reviewers and seminar participants at 
the GTAP Conference in June 2016 at the World Bank, Washington DC.
Page 17 of 18Narayanan and Khorana  Economic Structures  (2017) 6:29 
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Availability of data and materials
Data used for the study have been summarized in the paper. More details may be shared with readers individually upon 
request.
Consent for publication
We hereby provide our full consent to publish this paper in this journal.
Ethics approval and consent to participate
Not applicable.
Funding
We gratefully acknowledge research funding from Bournemouth University for this paper.
Publisher’s Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Received: 22 March 2017   Accepted: 12 October 2017
References
Brown DK, Kiyota K, Stern RM (2010) Computational analysis of the menu of US–Japan trade policies. RSIE discussion 
paper no. 611, Ford School of Public Policy, University of Michigan
Chappius T, Walmsley T (2011) Projections for world CGE model baselines. GTAP Research Memorandum No: 22. Septem-
ber. The Center for Global Trade Analysis, Purdue University, West Lafayette, USA
 Clarke M (2008) Vulnerability, prevention and human trafficking: the need for a new paradigm: anintroduction to human 
trafficking: Vulnerability, impact and action, UN Organization on Drugs and Crime,Vienna
Clark SE, Hawkes C, Murphy SME, Hansen-Kuhn KA, Wallinga D (2012) Exporting obesity: US farm and trade policy and 
the transformation of the Mexican consumer food environment. Int J Occup Environ Health 18:53–64
Ciuriak D, Jingliang X (2014) The trans-pacific partnership: evaluating the ‘Landing Zone‘ fornegotiations. Working Paper
DeRosa DA, Gilbert JP (2004) Technical Appendix: Quantitative Estimates of the EconomicImpacts of US Bilateral Free 
Trade Agreements. In: Jeffrey JS (ed)  Free Trade Agreements: U.S. Strategies and Priorities, Washington, D.C, Institute 
for International Economics
Drahos P (2003) Access to medicines: after doha. In:  Grynberg R, Turner E (eds) multilateral and regional trade issues for 
developingcountries. Commonwealth Secretariat, London
El-said M (2010) Public health related TRIPS-Plus provisions in bilateral trade agreements: a policyguide for negotiations 
and implementers in the eastern mediterranean region’. In: World Health Organization(WHO) and the International 
Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD)
Foure J, Benassy-Quere A, Fontagne L (2010) The world economy in 2050: a tentative picture. CEPII working paper 2010-
27, CEPII, Paris, France
Gaisford JD, Hobbs JE, Kerr WA (2007) Will the TRIPS Agreement foster appropriate biotechnologies for developing coun-
tries? J Agric Econ 58(2):199–217
Hagiwara T, Matsubayashi Y (2014) Capital accumulation, vintage and productivity: the Japanese experience. Discussion 
paper no. 1418, Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University. Available online at http://www.econ.kobe-u.ac.jp/
RePEc/koe/wpaper/2014/1418.pdf
Hummels D, Minor P (2009) Time as a barrier to trade: a GTAP database of ad valorem trade timecosts (Paper presented at 
the 13th Annual Conference on Global Economic Analysis, Penang, Malaysia
Ianchovichina E, McDougall R (2001) "Structure of Dynamic GTAP.” GTAP Technical Paper 17, Centerfor Global Trade Analy-
sis, available on line athttp://www.gtap.org
Ianchovichina E, Walmsley T (eds) (2012) Dynamic modeling and applications for global economic analysis. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge
Ianchovichina E, Hertel T, Walmsley T (2014) Projections for world CGE model baselines. GTAP Research Memorandum no. 
26 February, The Center for Global Trade Analysis, Purdue University, West Lafayette, USA
Kee HL, Nicita A, Olarreaga M (2009) Estimating trade restrictiveness indices. Economic Journal 119:172–199
Kerr WA (2003) The efficacy of TRIPS: incentives, capacity and threats. Estey Centre J Int Law Trade Policy 4(1):1–14
Kerr WA (2005) Agriculture: a key to the WTO Doha Development Agenda. In: Proceedings of an Asian Development 
Bank high level meeting on WTO Key Doha Round issues, Osaka, Japan, 3–5 Aug
Kerr WA (2007) Trade related aspects of intellectual property: enforcement issues. In: Kerr WA, Gaisford JD (eds) Handbook 
on international trade policy. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, pp 520–526
Kerr WA (2011) Conflict, chaos and confusion: the crisis in the international trading system. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham
Lee H, Itakura K (2015) The implications of region-wide FTAs for Japan and emerging Asia, Osaka School of International 
Public Policy (OSIPP) Discussion paper no. 2015-E-001, March 31, 2015, available online at http://www.osipp.osaka-u.
ac.jp/archives/DP/2015/DP2015E001.pdf. Assessed on 2 Mar 2017
Lee H,  Itakura K (2014) TPP RCEP and Japan’s agricultural policy reforms. OSIPP DiscussionPaper, Osaka School of Interna-
tional Public Policy, Osaka
Page 18 of 18Narayanan and Khorana  Economic Structures  (2017) 6:29 
Mimouni M, Pichot X, Narayanan B (2014) Utilization of preferential tariffs. Paper presented at 2014 conference of global 
economic analysis, Dakar, Senegal. Abstract available online at https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/resources/
res_display.asp?RecordID=4458. Assessed on 2 Mar 2017
Minor P, Hummels D (2011) Time as a barrier to trade: a GTAP database of ad valorem trade time costs. Paper presented 
at 13th annual conference on global economic analysis, Penang, Malaysia. Available online at L: https://www.gtap.
agecon.purdue.edu/resources/res_display.asp?RecordID=3301. Assessed on 2 Mar 2017
Narayanan BG, Aguiar A, McDougall R (eds) (2012) Global trade, assistance, and production: the GTAP 8 data base. Center 
for Global Trade Analysis, Purdue University, West Lafayette. Available online at: https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.
edu/databases/v8/v8_doco.asp. Assessed on 2 Mar 2017
Narayanan GB, Ciuriak D, Singh HV (2016) Quantifying trans-Pacific partnership and transatlantictrade and investment 
partnership spillovers on India. Chapter 4 in ed. HV Singh. TPP and India. WisdomTree Publishers, India.
Reichenmiller P (2005) Tightening TRIPS: the intellectual property provisions of recent US free trade Agreements. World 
Bank, Washington, DC. Trade Note no. 20. Online access: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETTRADE/
Resources/Pubs/TradeNote20.pdf. Assessed on 2 March 2017
Roffe P, Von Braun J, Vivas-Eugui D (2008) A new generation of regional and bilateral trade Agreements: lessons from 
the US-CAFTA-DR Agreement. In: Blouin C, Drager N, Heymann J (eds) Trade and health: seeking common ground. 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, Montréal, pp 41–89
Vivas-Eugui D (2003) Regional and bilateral Agreements and a TRIPS-plus world: the Free Trade Area of the Americas 
(FTAA), TRIPS issues papers no. 1, Geneva
Walmsley Terry, Hertel Thomas, Ianchovichina E (2006) Assessing the impact of China’s WTO accession on investment. Pac 
Econ Rev 11(3):315–319
Wang Z, Mohan S, Rosen D (2009) Methodology for estimating services trade barriers. Rhodium Group and Peterson 
Institute for International Economics
World Health Organisation (WHO) (2014) Draft sugars consultation children and adults http://www.who.int/mediacen-
tre/news/notes/2014/consultation-sugar-guideline/en/. Assessed on 2 Mar 2017
World Health Organisation (WHO) (2015) Guideline: sugars intake for adults and children. World Health Organization, 
Geneva
